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The American Society of Law and Medicine has chosen to
honor Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the United States
Supreme Court with its first Presidents' Award for Distinguished
Contributions to the Fields of Law and Medicine. It is my task to
explain why that honor is so richly deserved.
To me the answer is simple: as much as any other judge in our
Nation's two hundred-year constitutional history, Harry Blackmun
has shaped and defined our modern conception of the constitutional
right to privacy, as well as our developing notions of the scope and
limits of medical privacy.' During his twenty-eight years on the fed-
eral bench and his seventeen years on the Supreme Court, Justice
Blackmun has played a major role in rebalancing what I call "the
medical triad" - the triangular relationship among the patient, the
doctor and the state, with which this Society's members are so inti-
mately familiar.
What experiences qualified this seemingly ordinary man to play
this extraordinary historical role? After reviewing Justice Black-
mun's lifelong odyssey through the fields of law and medicine, I
would suggest that his career can be divided into four eras: what I
will call the era of apprenticeship, the era of authority, the era of
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; B.A. Harvard 1975; B.A. Oxford 1977;
J.D. Harvard 1980; Law Clerk to justice Harry A. Blackmun, October Term 1981. This essay
deriv's from remarks delivered at the Annual General Meeting of The American Society of
Law and Medicine in Boston, Massachusetts on October 23, 1987. I am grateful to Robert
Burt and Joseph Goldstein for their insightful comments on an earlier draft and to Marina L.
Sheriff of the Yale Law School Class of 1989 for her fine research assistance.
I By singling out this contribution, I do not mean to slight other areas in which Justice
Blackmun has played an equally profound role in shaping the Court's jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L.
REV. 51 (1985); Kobylka, The Court, Justice Blackmun, and Federalism: A Subtle Movement with Poten-
tially Great Ramifications, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 9 (1985); McDaniel, Public Trials, 8 HAMLINE L.
REV. 127 (1985); Moore, Justice Blackmun's Contributions on the Court: The Commercial Speech and
State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 29 (1985).
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accountability, and the era of autonomy. As he has grown through
each of these eras, Justice Blackmun has increasingly used his judi-
cial position to rebalance the relationship among the patient, the
doctor and the state. In majority, concurrence, and dissent, he has
pressed the Court to lessen the deference owed to authority figures
(whether represented by doctors or the state); to hold institutional
authorities accountable for their actions, both to individual physi-
cians and to patients; and to protect both doctors' rights of profes-
sional autonomy and patients' rights to individual autonomy.
I. THE ERA OF APPRENTICESHIP
Let me begin with Justice Blackmun's "era of apprenticeship"
- an era that spanned what for most people would be several pro-
fessional lifetimes - the sixty-one years he spent as a student, a law
clerk, a practicing attorney, and a lower federal court judge, before
he assumed his seat on the Supreme Court. During this first era,
Justice Blackmun gained his deep and subtle appreciation of the
complexities of the medical profession and the moral and ethical
challenges that physicians daily face.
While growing up in St. Paul, Minnesota in the 1920's, the son
of a grocery and hardware storeowner, the future Supreme Court
Justice wanted more than anything else to be a doctor. 2 But after
winning a scholarship to Harvard College, election to Phi Beta
Kappa, and earning his B.A. in mathematics summa cum laude, this
nonconfrontational man left the sciences for Harvard Law School,
forsaking the "honorable and merciful calling" of medicine for the
more confrontational profession of law.'
His first seventeen years after law school Justice Blackmun
spent in Minneapolis, beginning with a 17-month clerkship with
Judge John B. Sanborn of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. Turning to private practice, he became an asso-
ciate, then a partner at the Dorsey firm, the preeminent Minneapolis
law partnership, specializing in the characteristically precise fields of
taxation, civil litigation, and trusts and estates.4 During those years,
2 See Jenkins, A Candid Talk With Justice Blackmun, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, at § 6 (Maga-
zine), 20, 24 (quoting Blackmun,J.)(" '[But] I probably would have been a poor physician.' ").
3 See Blackmun, Remarks at the Commencement Exercises of Mayo Medical School, 55 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 573, 575 (1980)[hereinafter Mayo Remarks].
4 See Pollett, Harry A. Blackmun, in 5 THEJUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
3, 5 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1978). Some commentators argue that justice Blackmun's
mathematics training, coupled with his extended exposure to the "exacting quantitative na-
ture" of tax law, have made him unusually "well-versed in the scientific method." See Schles-
inger & Nesse,Justice Harry Blackmun and Empirical jursprudence, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 405, 406 &
n.3 (1980). Drawing upon this background, the Justice uses empirical data and statistical anal-
ysis to add precision to the Court's reasoning and to "assist the court in reaching fair adjudi-
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the Dorsey firm represented, then became general counsel to, the
Mayo Clinic and the Mayo Association in Rochester, Minnesota, a
continuing representation for which Mr. Blackmun took increasing
responsibility. In 1950, the future Justice finally left his firm to be-
come the Mayo Clinic's first resident counsel, spending what he has
later called the "happiest decade" of his life,5 a "decade of close and
intimate association . .. with people of medicine, with the medical
mind and medical ways, and with medical education and research
"6
In 1959, President Eisenhower nominated Justice Blackmun to
replace his mentor, Judge Sanborn, on the Eighth Circuit. During
the next eleven years, Justice Blackmun's caseload did not often
thrust him into legal-medical controversies, although his judicial
colleagues routinely deferred to his expertise on medical questions
when they arose.7 Thus, except for his later, fleeting recollection
that most of the malpractice cases that came before him were "re-
solved in favor of the complaining patient rather than the defending
doctor,"8 the Eighth Circuit years offer little insight into Justice
Blackmun's evolving medical jurisprudence.
In 1970, after the Senate had rejected both Clement Hayn-
sworth and G. Harrold Carswell as replacements for Justice Abe
Fortas, President Nixon turned to Justice Blackmun as a noncontro-
cative results." Id. at 406. For a discussion of two recent cases in which Blackmun
understood the import of statistical data and the Court did not, see Appelbaum, The Empirical
Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 335 (1987) (discussing Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)).
5 Jenkins, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting Blackmun, J.) (" 'It was the happiest decade in the
lives of my wife and myself.... I was able to have a foot in both camps - law and
medicine.' ").
6 Mayo Remarks, supra note 3, at 573. Justice Blackmun later testified that "my experience
[at the Mayo Clinic] . . . fortified me, made me somewhat better educated and more knowl-
edgeable in medical fields than I otherwise would be." Harry A. Blackmun: Hearing Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1970)(testimony of Blackmun, J.) [hereinafter
Confirmation Hearing]. During his Mayo years, the Justice served as a member of the Mayo
Section of Administration, and played a major role in founding the Rochester Methodist Hos-
pital, for which he served as a Director, Executive Committee member, and Secretary. During
this period, he also authored a number of articles on legal-medical subjects. See, e.g., Black-
mun, The Physician and his Estate, 36 MINN. MED. 1033 (October 1953); Blackmun, Legal
Problems Attendant Upon the Late Effects of Head Injuries, reprinted in THE LATE EFFECTS OF HEAD
INJURY (A. Walker, W. Caveness & M. Critchley, eds. 1969). In honor of the justice's work as
legal counsel, in 1977 the Clinic dedicated the'Blackmun Law Library in his honor.
7 See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 6, at 41 (testimony of Judge Blackmun) ("We, of
course, have had some malpractice cases [in the Eighth Circuit]. ... I find myself confronted
with the fact that my colleagues say, I am glad you are sitting on this kind of a case because
you know medical problems better than I do.").
8 Id. For a thorough survey of Justice Blackmun's Eighth Circuit opinions, see Lay, The
Cases of Blackmun, J on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1959 -1970, 8 HAM-
LINE L. REV. 2 (1985).
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versial, moderate candidate for the Supreme Court.9 The American
Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary,
then chaired by no less aggressive an examiner than Lawrence
Walsh, now the Iran-Contra Affair special prosecutor, announced
that it would investigate Blackmun's qualifications more extensively
than those of any prior Supreme Court nominee.'" After the ABA
Committee concluded that he met "high standards of professional
competence, temperament and integrity,"' 'Justice Blackmun won
unanimous Supreme Court confirmation.' 2
II. THE ERA OF AUTHORITY
Following these apprenticeship years, Justice Blackmun's first
three years on the Supreme Court marked a second era, which I call
"the era of authority." During this periodJustice Blackmun's vision
of the medical triad betrayed an idealistic, almost naive, faith in au-
thority figures: a seemingly reflexive trust of governmental institu-
tions and a casual confidence in the goodness and competence of
medical doctors and the medical profession."' One of Justice Black-
mun's first opinions for the Court, the 1971 case of Richardson v.
Perales,'4 raised the question whether physicians' written medical ex-
amination reports, neither signed under oath nor subjected to cross-
examination (and therefore hearsay evidence), could be used at a
Social Security hearing to deny an injured truckdriver's disability in-
surance claim. Justice Blackmun ruled that the reports could be so
used, based in part on his intuition that judges "cannot... ascribe
bias to the work of these independent physicians, or any interest on
their part in the outcome of the administrative proceeding beyond
the professional curiosity a dedicated medical man possesses."5 In
a biting dissent, Justice Douglas noted that "[o]ne doctor whose
word cast this claimant into limbo never saw him, never examined
him, never took his vital statistics or saw him try to walk or bend or
lift weights."'16 Reflecting a skepticism about institutional preroga-
9
See L. KOHLMEIER, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 173 (1973) ("Blackmun was a
political compromise, a noncontroversial judge who had no taste either for resisting the War-
ren Court's doctrines or pressing-forward constitutional rights").
10 See Pollett, supra note 4, at 4.
11 See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 6, at 12 (letter from the ABA Standing Comm. on
the Fed. Judiciary).
12 See Pollett, supra note 4, at 4.
13 This theme is developed further in Note, The Changing Social Vision ofJustice Blackmun, 96
HARV. L. REV. 717, 719-22 (1983).
14 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
15 Id. at 403.
16 Id. at 413 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tives that Justice Blackmun himself would latei embrace,' 7 Justice
Douglas opined that the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, a "presently powerful federal bureaucracy", was wreaking a
"grave injustice ... on an individual" by denying him Social Secur-
ity benefits, and "cutting ... corners" with the help of a "stable of
defense doctors" working for the government.'
8
Two years later, in Doe v. Bolton,' 9 Justice Blackmun authored
the Court's opinion invalidating a Georgia statutory scheme that
criminalized abortions in all but a few circumstances. In striking
down a provision of the statute that prevented a doctor from per-
forming an abortion without the advance approval of an "abortion
committee" made up of hospital staff members, Justice Blackmun
chided the state legislature for its "lack of confidence in the integrity
of physicians. '"20 Justice Blackmun found the committee approval
requirement "somewhat degrading to the conscientious physician,"
and suggested that "[tlhe good physician - despite the presence of
rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust that most
physicians are 'good' - will have sympathy and understanding for
the pregnant patient that probably are not exceeded by those who
participate in other areas of professional counseling."'"
In short, Justice Blackmun's early decisions on the Court re-
garding law and medicine reflected his prior extended contact with
talented and responsible physicians and healthy, progressive institu-
tions like the Mayo Clinic. In defining his own judicial role, Justice
Blackmun's early instinct was to afford patients' rights no extraordi-
nary protection, assuming that those rights Would be amply pro-
tected if he trusted and deferred to the expertise and discretion of
those professionals and institutions.
III. THE ERA OF ACCOUNTABILITY
These early opinions set the stage in 1973 for Roe v. Wade,2" the
17 See infra text accompanying notes 29-53. Ironically, in a dissent written more than a
decade later, Blackmun would himself question whether psychiatric testimony regarding a
defendant's future dangerousness should be admissible in a capital case, given proof that such
testimony is wrong two times out of three. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("when a person's life is at stake-no matter how heinous his of-
fense-a requirement of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testi-
mony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable
untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself."). For further expli-
cation of Justice Blackmun's Barefoot dissent, see Appelbaum, supra note 4, and Stone, Justice
Blackmun: A Survey of His Decisions in Psychiatry and Law, 13 AM.J. L. & MED. 291 (1987).
18 402 U.S. at 413-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
19410 U.S. 179 (1973).
20 d. at 196.
21 Id. at 196-97.
22410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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decision that would make Justice Blackmun immortal. 23 That con-
troversial decision not only changed America, it profoundly
changed Harry Blackmun.2 4 As those who have read The Brethren are
aware, Justice Blackmun agonized over that decision in a manner
that some commentators found unseemly.25  His search for gui-
dance from medical history and literature drove him to spend two
weeks in the Mayo Clinic's medical library, examining prevailing
medical and legal attitudes toward abortion, and searching for the
origins of the Hippocratic Oath.26
Roe v. Wade bears many of the earmarks of the eras of appren-
ticeship and authority, and of Justice Blackmun's early proclivity to
trust too fully in the goodness of doctors. Roe held that a woman's
right, in consultation with her physician, to choose an abortion is
absolute in the first trimester of pregnancy, qualified by the state's
interest in protecting the fetus in the second trimester, and subject
to state prohibition in the third. Yet much of that opinion's now
familiar interest-balancing analysis sounded as if the individual right
being protected was that of the doctor and not the patient. 27 By leav-
23 Along with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Roe is perhaps the only
Supreme Court case decided this century that most Americans know by name. See Hazard,
Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 157 (1986) ("The leading case of the 1950's,
indeed of the century, is of course Brown v. Board ofEducation.... That of the 1970's is unques-
tionably Roe v. Wade."). Accord, Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLum. L. REV. 873, 873
(1987)(Roe is a "defining case" in modern constitutional jurisprudence).
24 See Remarks by H. Blackmun, Franco-American Colloquium on Human Rights 15 (Dec.
19, 1979) [hereinafter Franco-American Colloquium] ("All this has changed my life, in a distinct
sense."). See also Neuborne, Blackmun: Intellectual Openness Elicits Needed Respect for the Judicial
Process, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 18, 1980, at 18, col. 2, 23, col. 1 ("The emergence of Blackmun as an
independent force [on the Court] began, of course, with his controversial opinion in Roe v.
Wade .... "); Note, supra note 13, at 725 ("Justice Blackmun's conception of healthy, self-
governing institutions.., has increasingly given way in the years since Roe to an emphasis on
an inquiry that discovers and responds to concrete problems."). For an analysis of Justice
Blackmun's decisions in the abortion cases, see Comment,Justice Harry A. Blackmun: The Abor-
tion Decisions, 34 ARK. L. REV. 276 (1980).
25 
See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 165-89, 229-40 (1979). By openly
agonizing over Roe "not only for myself, but [also] for the Court," Justice Blackmun con-
sciously "disobeyed one suggestion Hugo Black made to me when I first came here. He said,
'Harry, never display agony in public, in an opinion. Never display agony. Never say that this
is an agonizing, difficult decision. Always write it as though it's clear as crystal.' "Jenkins,
supra note 2, at 26 (quoting Blackmun, J.).
26 See Franco-American Colloquium, supra note 24, at 14. In his research, Justice Blackmun
canvassed, inter alia, the views of the American Medical Association, the American Public
Health Association and the American Bar Association. Id.
27 Roe's heavy emphasis on the rights of doctors accounts for much of its unpopularity
among legal scholars. See, e.g., Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirma-
tive Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 335 (1985) ("[Tlhe Supreme
Court in 2?oe v. Wade spoke as though it were protecting the 'privacy' rights of both the woman
and her physician, and indeed at times as though the physician's rights were somehow pri-
mary .... ); Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The
Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 51, 59 (1983) ("Blackmun's abortion
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ing the state "free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the
period of pregnancy lengthens," Roe sought to "vindicat[e] the right
of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his
professional judgment up to the points where important state inter-
ests provide compelling justifications for intervention.
28
What is important for present purposes, however, is that Roe v.
Wade expressly protected an individual patient's rights against the
state by restricting the freedom of a politically motivated legislature
to regulate physicians' discretion to make medical decisions. By so
doing, Roe marked Justice Blackmun's transition into a third era of
judicial awareness, which I call the era of accountability.
Outsiders can only speculate about why Justice Blackmun be-
gan to demand institutional accountability at this time. But part of
the explanation must surely lie in the personal agonies he endured
both during and after deciding Roe.29 The Supreme Court's sprawl-
ing docket exposed the Justice to a far broader, and more brutal,
slice of life than the Eighth Circuit's had ever done.30 The relentless
cascade of oral arguments, briefs, and certiorari petitions painted
for the Justice a picture of society far less tranquil than the one he
had previously known: a society of antagonistic classes, irreconcila-
ble social conflicts, and unchecked personal suffering.3 ' The picture
painted was one in which all social institutions are not responsible,
healthy, or progressive, and in which a philosophy of judicial defer-
ence might amount to judicial abdication in the face of institutional
abuse. As an Eighth Circuit Judge, Justice Blackmun had not hesi-
tated to use his judicial role to enforce an individual's constitutional
opinions are as much vindications of the right of the physician to practice medicine as they are
feminist 'pro-choice' victories - if not more so.").
28 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 165-66 (emphasis added). See also id. at 166 ("Up to those
points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision,
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.").
29 See Jenkins, supra note 2, at 26 ("[Blackmun's] office has received more than 45,000
letters about [Roe v. Wade.] ('Think of any name; I've been called it in these letters: Butcher of
Dachau, murderer, Pontius Pilate, Adolph Hitler'), and he is still.., picketed by anti-abortion
groups when he shows up for speaking engagements .... ").
30 See, e.g. ,Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion one year before Roe in the decision that
temporarily invalidated the death penalty, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405
(1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony
of the spirit.").
31 See Mayo Remarks, supra note 3, at 573-74 (remarks of Blackmun J.)("The Court is a
special place to observe from .... One sees what people-including medical people, their
patients, and hospitals-are litigating about today, not only with each other but with their
governments-federal, state, and municipal. One gets a sense of their desires and their frus-
trations, of their hopes and their disappointments, of their profound personal concerns, and
of what they regard as important and as crucial. ... We see, in sum, what I think is a constant,
seething, economic, domestic, and ethical struggle.").
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guarantees against an overreaching governmental institution.32
During the era of accountability, Justice Blackmun began to recast
his judicial role more generally toward this orientation, now viewing
"the task of the judiciary ... not [as simply] to defer to institutional
discretion, but rather to resolve the conflicts among institutions and
individuals" in a way that fully protected individual rights. 3 Thus,
in this third era, which ran through the latter part of the 1970's,
Justice Blackmun became noticeably less trustful of the state of hos-
pitals, or indeed, of the Supreme Court itself as paternalistic institu-
tions that invariably have an individual's best interests at heart.34
Instead, he began openly to acknowledge that the enormous power
of these institutions entails a commensurate measure of accountabil-
ity and social responsibility.
This new pattern in Justice Blackmun's thinking first became
evident in his 1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana,35 which considered
the duties owed by Indiana to Jackson, a 27 year-old retarded deaf
mute. After Jackson had been arrested for allegedly stealing nine
dollars, two court-appointed psychiatrists found him incapable of
understanding the charges against him. That determination led to
32 See, e.g.,Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968)(Blackmun, J.)(holding that the
use of a leather strap to discipline convicts in the Arkansas state penitentiary violated the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the eighth amendment).
33 Note, supra note 13, at 722-23. Cf Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the
Constitution, 85 MiCH. L. REV. 1741, 1803 (1987)(Furman, Roe, and the Nixon Tapes Case arose at
a time of "pervasive doubts about the legitimacy of our governmental institutions. These
doubts were fueled by the prior decade's convulsive experience of political assassinations,
race riots, and an Asian war whose brutality escalated as its intelligibility declined. Because
the Justices saw themselves as special guardians of legitimacy in American society, it is not
surprising that they should also see a special curative mission for themselves arising from
these convulsive challenges to legitimacy.").
34 Compare Wyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971) (Blackmun, J., for the Court) (de-
picting welfare caseworker as "not a sleuth but rather, we trust .... a friend to one in need")
with Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 46 (1981) (Blackmun,J., dissenting)
("When the parent is indigent, lacking in education, and easily intimidated by figures of au-
thority, the imbalance [between the state and an individual whose parental rights it seeks to
terminate] may well become insuperable."). My colleague Robert Burt has traced a parallel
trend injustice Blackmun's writings on the death penalty. See Burt, supra note 33. In Profes-
sor Burt's view, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Furman, supra note 30, revealed an "obvious
struggle between his conscience and his conception ofjudicial role obligations." See 85 MICH.
L. REV. at 1757. This probably contributed to his stony silence in the death penalty cases
heard during the next decade. In a series of 1983 and 1987 decisions, however, a "newly
vocal," Blackmun, id. at 1818, "seemed almost to explode in rhetorical force," id. at 1817,
declaring that "[tihe errors and misteps [overlooked by the Court] ... are too much for me to
condone." Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 991 (1983)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1794 (1987)(Blackmun, J., dissenting); California v.
Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 850 (1987)(Blackmun, J., dissenting); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992, 1029 (1983)(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916
(1983)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35 406 U.S. 715 (1972). For further discussion ofJackson, see Stone, supra note 17, and A.
STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 104-06 (1984).
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his commitment for three and one-half years to a state mental facil-
ity where no medical treatment was provided and no one knew sign
language.36 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun held
that Jackson's extended commitment to the institution, based solely
upon his incapacity to stand trial, denied Jackson his fourteenth
amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the
laws.37 He further emphasized that whenever a state takes on the
institutional commitment of any individual for care and treatment, it
necessarily assumes the responsibility to do something more than
merely warehouse him. "At the least," Justice Blackmun stated,
"due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed."3 8
Ten years later, Justice Blackmun elaborated upon this stan-
dard in his concurring opinion in Youngberg v. Romeo, in which he was
joined by Justices Brennan and O'Connor. 9 Nicholas Romeo, a
profoundly retarded 33 year-old, had been involuntarily committed
to Pennsylvania's infamous Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
where he had been injured more than sixty times. Writing for the
Court, Justice Powell concluded that the state was required to pro-
vide Romeo minimally adequate or reasonable training, but only to
the extent necessary to ensure his safety and allow him freedom
from undue restraint.4 0 By so ruling, the majority avoided the much
harder question "whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily
committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional
right to training per se. ' ' 4 1 Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the
judgment, even called it "frivolous" to suggest that Romeo might
have such a federally enforceable right to treatment.42 But Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in the Court's opinion invoked the Jackson
standard to suggest that, once Pennsylvania had chosen to commit
Romeo for "care and treatment," it had a constitutional responsibil-
ity to provide him treatment as well as care.43 Justice Blackmun fur-
36 Jackson's attorney argued that "Jackson's commitment under these circumstances
amounted to a 'life sentence' without his ever having been convicted of a crime .... 406 U.S.
at 719.
37 Id. at 730, 738-39. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Id. at 717.
38 Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
39457 U.S. 307, 325 (1982)(Blackmun, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 319. For a critique of the Court's Youngberg opinion, see A. STONE, supra note 35,
at 126 ("[H]aving established that right, the Court found some paternalism under the shell of
liberty").
41 457 U.S. at 318.
4 2 Id. at 330 n.* (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
43 Id. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("If a state court orders a mentally retarded per-
son committed for 'care and treatment,' . . . commitment without any 'treatment' whatsoever
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ther suggested that Romeo might also have a constitutional right to
that degree of training necessary to preserve those basic self-care
skills with which he had entered Pennhurst - for example, the abil-
ity to dress himself and to attend to his own personal hygiene. "For
many mentally retarded people," Justice Blackmun reasoned, "the
difference between the capacity to do things for themselves within
an institution and total dependence on the institution for all their
needs is as much liberty as they ever will know."44
Justice Blackmun subsequently extended his vision of institu-
tional accountability not simply to hospitals and mental institu-
tions,45 but also to medical schools. In the Court's famous
affirmative action decision, Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,46 Justice Blackmun's separate opinion suggested that medical
schools bear a special responsibility for diversifying, as well as train-
ing, the population of medical doctors. Justice Blackmun noted that
until the early 1970's, less than 2% of the doctors, lawyers, medical
and law students had originated from minority groups and that
would not bear a reasonable relation to the purposes of the person's confinement.") (empha-
sis in original).
44 Id. at 327. In arguing that an individual has a right not just to freedom from harm, but
also to freedom to flourish and develop, Justice Blackmun espoused a concept of liberty far
fuller than the majority's. Compare I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR EsSAYS ON LIBERTY
121 (1979) (elaborating on the distinction between "freedom from" and "freedom to") with
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 327 (Blackmun,J., concurring) ("If a person could demonstrate that he
entered a state institution with minimal self-care skills, but lost those skills after commitment
because of the State's unreasonable refusal to provide him training, then, it seems to me, he
has alleged a loss of liberty quite distinct from-and as serious as-the loss of safety and
freedom from unreasonable restraints."). It seems likely that Justice Blackmun's decision to
concur in the Court's narrower holding was driven by two strategic motives: to blunt Chief
Justice Burger's suggestion that the Court's narrow ruling had somehow implicitly rejected
the possibility of a broader constitutional right to treatment, see supra note 42; and to offer a
theory that would attract the future support ofJustice O'Connor, then in her first term on the
Court. See text accompanying note 39, supra.
45 For another example of Justice Blackmun's view of institutional accountability, see
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), in which the Court denied
chronically ill elderly nursing home patients a hearing before their nursing home was decerti-
fled for Medicare and Medicaid benefits. The Court flatly rejected the residents' claim that
their home's decertification would deprive them of life, liberty, and property by exposing
them to "transfer trauma"-an alleged increase in morbidity and mortality resulting from
their forced relocation from one institution to another. Justice Blackmun refused to "join
such a heartless holding," which he argued effectively diminished the state's accountability for
its actions. Id. at 803 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He concluded that in fact, decertification
could deny the claimants "liberty" and "property" interests. Id. at 791-92. He went on, how-
ever, to analyze the state of medical research on "transfer trauma," and found that research
too inconclusive to support the patients' claim that such a deprivation had actually occurred.
Id. at 804. See also Cohen, Legislative and Educational Alternatives to a Judicial Remedy for the Trans-
fer Trauma Dilemma, 11 AM. J.L. & MED. 405, 411 (1986) ("The present state of research on
transfer trauma justifies Justice Blackmun's conclusion and forecloses any judicial recognition
of transfer trauma.").
46438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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three-fourths of our black physicians had trained at only two medi-
cal schools; he therefore voted to uphold the University of Califor-
nia's affirmative action program, declaring that, "[i]f ways are not
found to remedy that situation the country can never achieve its
professed goal of a society that is not race conscious .... In order to
get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no
other way."
47
A third institution from which Justice Blackmun began to de-
mand accountability was the Supreme Court itself. In three 1977
rulings, Poelker v. Doe,48 Beal v. Doe, " and Maher v. Roe,50 the Court
upheld, over Justice Blackmun's dissent, state decisions to deny in-
digent women seeking abortions medical reimbursements and pub-
lic hospital facilities, while simultaneously funding the greater
expenses of women who took the medically less risky step of carry-
ing their children to term.5' In an intensely personal dissent, Justice
Blackmun challenged his colleagues for allowing the states and mu-
nicipalities to infringe indirectly upon the privacy right that Roe v.
Wade had said they could not directly restrict. 52 By so doing, Justice
Blackmun suggested, the Court had rendered itself accountable to
the rich but not the poor:
For the individual woman concerned, indigent and fi-
nancially helpless.... the result is punitive and tragic. Im-
plicit in the Court's holding is the condescension that she
may go elsewhere for her abortion. I find that disingenu-
ous and alarming, almost reminiscent of. "Let them eat
cake."...
[The Court permits a presumed majority to] punitively
impres[s] upon a needy minority its own concepts of the
socially desirable, the publicly acceptable and the morally
sound....
There is another world "out there," the existence of
which the Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or
fears to recognize. And so the cancer of poverty will con-
tinue to grow. This is a sad day for those who regard the
Constitution as a force that would serve justice to all even-
47 Id. at 403, 407 (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.).
48432 U.S. 519 (1977).
49432 U.S. 438 (1977).
50432 U.S. 464 (1977).
51 Poelker held that public hospitals that provided publicly financed services for childbirth
were not also constitutionally required to perform abortions. Beal and Maher additionally held
that states were not required under the Medicaid or Social Security programs to pay the ex-
penses incident to nontherapeutic abortions.
52 See 432 U.S. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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handedly and, in so doing, would better the lot of the
poorest among us.
53
IV. THE ERA OF AUTONOMY
Although Justice Blackmun's decision in Roe v. Wade won him
many public admirers, the heart of his constitutional analysis has
proven far more. controversial. That analysis, which located the
Constitution's protection of a woman's abortion decision in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, has been savagely at-
tacked by legal scholars ranging from John Hart Ely to Robert
Bork.54 Many constitutional law scholars have suggested how Roe
could have been more artfully drafted.55 But in the end, none of
them has put forth a more powerful rationale for the core of that
decision than Justice Blackmun himself has subsequently offered.
In a series of opinions that have now stretched into the late
1980's, the fourth and most recent era of his career, we witness a
subtle shift in Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence: a movement away
from the language of authority and institutional accountability56 to
the notion that the abortion decisions ultimately rest on the central-
53 Id. at 462-63. Three years later, Justice Blackmun reiterated his Beal dissent in Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), which upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, a
statute eliminating federal funding for almost all abortions. See id. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). For critiques of Harris, see Tribe, supra note 27, at 336-40; Perry, Why the Supreme
Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 1113 (1980).
Three years after Harris, in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983),
Blackmun again displayed his sensitivity to the concerns of indigent women seeking abor-
tions. Dissenting from that portion of the majority's decision upholding a statutory require-
ment that abortions be followed by submission of tissue samples to a board-eligible or
certified pathologist, Blackmun argued that mandatory resort to a pathologist did not further
important state-related health concerns and could increase the cost of a first-trimester abor-
tion by as much as $40. See id. at 497 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Although this increase may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I
cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every woman seeking an abortion." ).
54 See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973);
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., June 10, 1981, at 310 (Testimony of Robert Bork)("I am convinced, as I think most
legal scholars are, that Roe v. Wade is itself, an unconstitutional decision, a serious and wholly
unjustifiable judicial usurpation of state legislative authority.").
55 See, e.g., Freund, Storms Over the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A.J. 1474, 1480 (1983); Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979); Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53-59 (1977); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the
Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976); Hey-
mann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade And Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973);
Tribe, Foreword, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1973).
56 By highlighting this rhetorical shift, I do not mean to suggest thatJustice Blackmun has
abandoned the emphasis upon institutional accountability that animated his decisionmaking
throughout the late 1970's. For a discussion of how the Justice has continued in recent opin-
HeinOnline -- 13 Am. J.L. & Med. 326 1987-1988
REBALANCING THE MEDICAL TRIAD
ity of autonomy: primarily the individual autonomy of the patient to
make intimate decisions uncoerced by the state and, secondarily, the
professional autonomy of the physician to counsel the patient in the
making of such fateful decisions. In this fourth era, the era of auton-
omy, Justice Blackmun's opinions have begun to sketch an evolving
notion of medical privacy, based upon the patient's individual auton-
omy, as supplemented by the doctor's professional autonomy.
57
I have already suggested that Justice Blackmun's solicitude for
the professional autonomy of doctors was evident even in earlier
eras. In the various abortion decisions that followed in the wake of
Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun had steadfastly protected the rights of
doctors to engage in responsible exercises of medical judgment.
Writing for the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,5" Justice
Blackmun had upheld Missouri's informed consent statute in abor-
tion cases, while warning against other informed consent statutes
that might "confine the attending physician in an undesired and un-
comfortable straitjacket." 59 Similarly, in Colautti v. Franklin,60 Jus-
tice Blackmun had struck down as unconstitutionally vague a
Pennsylvania criminal statute that failed to give physicians clear no-
tice of what medical activities they could permissibly undertake
when performing constitutionally protected abortions.6 But what
ions "to invoke and to act on images of abuse by institutions, structural harm, and individual
suffering," see Note, supra note 13, at 725-31.
57 For more detailed discussions of evolving notions of patient and professional auton-
omy, see Baron, On Knowing One's Chains and Decking Them With Flowers: Limits on Patient Auton-
omy in "The Silent World of Doctor and Patient," 9 W.N. ENG. L. REV. 31 (1987); Johnson,
Sequential Domination, Autonomy and Living Wills, 9 W.N. ENG. L. REV. 113 (1987); and Spiegel,
Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on Corporate Lawyering and the Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 9 W.N. ENG. L. REV. 139 (1987).
58428 U.S. 52 (1976).
59 Id. at 67 n.8.
60439 U.S. 379 (1979).
61 InJustice Blackmun's view, the statute too narrowly limited a doctor's medical discre-
tion to make determinations regarding the viability of a fetus. He declared:
Because [the point of viability] may differ with each pregnancy, neither the legisla-
ture nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertain-
ment of viability - be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor
- as the determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in the life or health
of the fetus....
We reaffirm.., that "the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is,
and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician."
Id. at 388-89, 396 (citations omitted).
In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), discussed in supra note 53,
Justice Blackmun expressed similar dissatisfaction with a statutory requirement that likewise
constrained physicians' discretion. A Missouri statute required the attendance of a second
physician at all postviability abortions. Noting that Missouri did not require a second physi-
cian to attend any other medical procedure, Justice Blackmun argued that:
[c]onsultation and teamwork are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operat-
ing room a patient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physi-
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distinguishes Justice Blackmun's modern opinions in the era of au-
tonomy from these earlier rulings is that they no longer champion a
physician's discretion for its own sake. Rather, they protect a doc-
tor's exercise of his or her medical judgment in order to maximize
the patient's ability to exercise his or her own autonomy.6 2 In the era
of autonomy, the primary right that Justice Blackmun would protect
is the right of the patient, regardless of age or marital status, 63 to
make intimate personal decisions without being coerced by the state
or by the doctor. In short, in the era of authority, when Justice
Blackmun wrote Roe v. Wade, he saw the question as "whether the
woman and her doctor, rather than an agency of government, should
have the authority to make the abortion decision at various stages of
pregnancy.''64 In his new era of individual and professional auton-
omy, Justice Blackmun would no longer grant the doctor final
choice, but would nevertheless shield the doctor's discretion from
state interference in order to ensure that the patient - in whose
hands the ultimate moral judgment rests - will receive the maxi-
mum advice and consultation.
Two opinions issued in 1986, Justice Blackmun's majority opin-
ion in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
65
cian. If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with the
lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detriment of both
woman and child.
462 U.S. at 503 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62 "To acknowledge that 'the patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the
[authorities'] duty to reveal [medical risks]' requires not that the patient's choice be an intelli-
gent, informed and unemotionally determined decision, but that it be the patient's choice and
that the authorities, of regard for him as a human being, honor that choice .... " Goldstein,
For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea
Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 695 (1975) (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). For a discus-
sion of how authorities may reconcile legal requirements of informed consent with notions of
deference to the dignity of the citizen as a human being, see id. at 692-93.
63 Writing for the Court in Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976),
Blackmun struck down various Missouri statutory provisions restricting an individual woman's
access to abortion, specifically those requiring spousal consent or parental consent for a mi-
nor. See id. at 67-75. Yet even after Danforth, the constitutionality of parental consent statutes
remains controversial. Compare Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)(plurality opin-
ion) (invalidating Massachusetts parental consent statute for abortion cases but stating that an
appropriately structured judicial-consent requirement would be constitutional) with Ashcroft,
462 U.S. at 503-04 (Blackmun,J., dissenting in part) (continuing to assert that neither parents
norjudges may veto a pregnant minor female's decision to have an abortion). Last Term, the
Court divided equally on the question whether Illinois could constitutionally require an un-
married minor to wait twenty-four hours before having an abortion, so that her parents could
be notified. Under the Illinois law, a doctor who performs an abortion on a minor without
notifying her parents, or who fails to observe the twenty-four hour statutory waiting period,
can be subjected to criminal prosecution. See Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987), affg
by an equally divided court, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).
64 Tribe, supra note 55, at 1 (emphasis added).
65 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
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and his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,66 illustrate Justice Blackmun's
deepened appreciation of both personal and professional auton-
omy. In Thornburgh, a group of plaintiffs that included the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, individual physicians
(including many who performed abortions), and abortion counsel-
ors brought a wide ranging challenge to the 1982 Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act. Striking down six provisions of that statute,
Justice Blackmun concluded that they impermissibly attempted to
deter a woman from making what he called "an intensely private"
decision 6 ' - "a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make." 6
In striking down provisions that required doctors to read printed
warnings to patients, Justice Blackmun held that the Commonwealth
could not "wedge [its] message discouraging abortion into the pri-
vacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her
physician." 69 Nor could Pennsylvania impose "state medicine ...
upon the woman," "officially structure ... the dialogue between the
woman and her physician," or make the doctor an "agent of the
State" by requiring the physician to offer the patient potentially ir-
relevant information.70 He concluded by saying:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution
embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individ-
ual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of govern-
ment. That promise extends to women as well as to men.
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more prop-
erly private, or more basic to individual dignity and auton-
omy, than a woman's decisio n - with the guidance of her
physician and within the limits specified in Roe - whether
to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice
freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would
protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty
that our law guarantees equally to all."
66 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
67 106 S. Ct. at 2181.
68 Id. at 2178 (emphasis added). AlthoughJustice Blackmun has perhaps felt institution-
ally constrained from formally repudiating Roe's reliance on the rights of both the doctor and
the patient, his Thornburgh opinion reflects a considered determination to shift Roe's emphasis
toward the autonomy of the individual, and not the doctor. That shift of emphasis makes
clear that the decision ultimately being protected rests in the hands of the patient, not the
physician. See id. ("In the years since . . . Roe, States and municipalities have adopted a
number of measures seemingly designed to prevent a woman, with the advice of her physi-
cian, from exercising her freedom of choice .... [T]he constitutional principles that led this
Court to its decisions in 1973 still provide the compelling reason for recognizing the constitu-
tional dimensions of a woman's right to decide whether to end her pregnancy.") (emphasis added).
69 1d. at 2179.
70 Id. at 2180.
71 Id. at 2184-85 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
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Ironically, Justice Blackmun's most eloquent defense of rights
of individual autonomy and privacy arose not in a legal-medical con-
text, but in a dissent from a case that had no direct medical over-
tones. In Bowers v. Hardwick,72 a five-Justice majority upheld a
Georgia sodomy statute, stating the issue as "whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States
that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time."7 Having cast the issue that way, it is hardly surprising that
the majority found no such right, reasoning that homosexual activity
is totally unconnected with family, marriage and procreation -
those areas that it found the Court had previously protected. 4 In a
dissent that one commentator has called "an opinion of lyric power,
... even literary beauty [that] will cement Justice Blackmun's claim
to being a justice of sensitivity and deep constitutional understand-
ing," 75 Justice Blackmun made it clear that he believed those earlier
decisions to rest on a broader ground: namely, an individual's right
to dignity and autonomy in the making of intimate personal
decisions.
Rather than paraphrase his words, I will let Justice Blackmun
speak for himself:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to de-
clare, than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental right
to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about
a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a tele-
phone booth. Rather, this case is about "the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men," namely, "the right to be let alone."...
The statute at issue denies individuals the right to de-
72 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 2843.
74 Id. at 2844. In fact, as Professor Tribe has recognized, the Court's prior decisions in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), had "protected the decision to engage
in sex without bearing or begetting a child. These holdings thus mandated heightened scru-
tiny not of state restrictions on procreative sex, but of restrictions on recreational or expres-
sional sex-sex solely as a facet of associational intimacy-whether between spouses or
between unmarried lovers. The Hardwick majority nevertheless treated [these] prior decisions
upholding access to contraceptives as if they involved the right to buy and use a particular
pharmaceutical product, rather than the right to engage in sexual intimacy as such." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTiTurriONAL LAw 1423 (2d ed. 1988)(emphasis in original).
7 5 Velvel, Zeus Didn't Nod: There's Hope After All for Justice Blackmun, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 6, 1986,
at 13, col. 2.
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cide for themselves whether to engage in particular forms
of private, consensual sexual activity....
The case before us implicates both the decisional and
the spatial aspects of the right to privacy....
The Court concludes today that none of our prior
cases dealing with various decisions that individuals are en-
titled to make free of governmental interference "bears
any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in
this case." . . . [But] [w]e protect [the] rights [at issue in
those earlier decisions] not because they contribute, in
some direct and material way, to the general public welfare,
but because they form so central a part of an individual's
life. "[T]he concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact
that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to soci-
ety as a whole.' " And so we protect the decision whether
to marry precisely because marriage "is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects." We protect the decision whether to have a child
because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual's
self-definition, not because of demographic considerations
or the Bible's command to be fruitful and multiply. And
we protect the family because it contributes so powerfully
to the happiness of individuals, not because of a preference
for stereotypical households. ...
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact
that sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of
human existence, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of human personality." The fact that
individuals define themselves in a significant way through
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in
a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right"
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of
the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom
an individual has to choose the form and nature of these in-
tensely personal bonds ....
[A] necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom
to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the
fact that different individuals will make different
choices. ...
It is precisely because the issue raised by this case
touches the heart of what makes individuals what they are
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that we should be especially sensitive to the rights of those
whose choices upset the majority....
[D]epriving individuals of the right to choose for
themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships
poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply rooted
in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity
could ever do. Because I think the Court today betrays
those values, I dissent.
76
In short, in Bowers, Justice Blackmun argued that the Constitu-
tion grants individuals a protected realm of private, intimate, per-
sonal decisions. The courts have chosen to protect these decisions
not merely because they are associated with respected institutions,
such as the family and marriage, but because they are central to an
individual's self-definition, sense of bodily well-being, and happi-
ness. This decisional aspect of the constitutional right to privacy, Jus-
tice Blackmun would argue, is broad enough to encompass an
emerging notion of medical privacy, namely, an individual's right,
with the counseling and expertise of an independent doctor, to
make certain intensely private medical decisions.
In sum, Harry Blackmun has traveled a long way from his era of
apprenticeship to his era of autonomy. After listening and deliber-
ating, he has reassessed and rebalanced the triadic relationship
among the patient, the doctor and the state. Over time, he has
come to view his judicial role as requiring him not simply to defer to
institutional prerogatives, but to hold governmental institutions ac-
countable for their actions, and to empower doctors against the
state and individuals vis-A-vis both doctors and the state. Some have
argued that this reevaluation reflects Justice Blackmun's ideological
shift leftward; others claim that Justice Blackmun has simply resisted
the rightward movement of the rest of the Court.7 7 But perhaps the
most simple and satisfying explanation is the Justice's own:
"[]udgment, judgment, judgment. It grows by experience and it
grows by learning."-78 More than 20 years ago, he wrote, "[w]e must
appreciate the practical aspects [of judging]. Judicial attitudes
change .... We progress, we hope, in legal and even in constitu-
tional interpretation. As in medicine . . . so in law, although more
slowly, there is constant movement. We should be aware of this,
anticipate it, and not resent it. We would not wish the situation to
76 106 S. Ct. at 2848, 2851-52, 2854, 2856 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (citations omitted).
77 Compare Note, supra note 13, at 717 n.6 (charting Justice Blackmun's leftward move-
ment) with Barbash & Kamen, Blackmun Says 'Weary' Court Is Shifting Right, Wash. Post, Sept.
20, 1984, at AI, col. 3.
78 Blackmun, Some Goals for Legal Education, 1 OHIo N.L. REv. 403, 408 (1974).
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be otherwise." 79
V. CONCLUSION
If you will permit an international lawyer one final observation:
to a degree unmatched by other nations, our constitutional system
has entrusted thejob of adapting the Constitution to changing times
not to the President or Congress, or to the unwieldy constitutional
convention process, but to unelected federal judges. As the career
of now-retired Associate Justice Lewis Powell revealed, our Ameri-
can system of making constitutional law gives Supreme Court jus-
tices enormous leeway to interpret cryptic constitutional texts, so
that a single Justice wields not only the defacto power to amend the
Constitution, but also the literal power of life and death.80
America's judicial heroes have traditionally been bold, outgo-
ing, larger-than-life men - Oliver Wendell Holmes, Felix Frank-
furter, William 0. Douglas - intellectually gifted and arrogant men
charged with a political vision and blessed with an effortless pen and
a biting tongue. Harry Blackmun, the most modest and self-effacing
of men, hardly fits this stereotype.8 ' But as the recent Supreme
Court confirmation hearings of Robert Bork have revealed, this old
image of the judicial hero no longer attracts everyone. For many, a
slashing judicial style now matters less than a thoughtful judicial at-
titude; a broad ideological vision counts less than open-minded and
fundamental fairness. A judge's technical brilliance proves less im-
portant than his or her careful attention to precedent and abiding
sensitivity to the rights of the weak.
Justice Blackmun's career has been full of ironies. As a lawyer,
he has had far more influence on the medical profession than he
ever would have had as a doctor. Shy by nature and conservative by
temperament, his sense of judicial duty has made him increasingly
bold in style and liberal in outlook. Because he has authored deci-
sions protecting a constitutional zone of privacy for others, he and
his wife have been forced to sacrifice much of their own jealously
guarded private life. And perhaps the greatest irony of all, by con-
sciously avoiding the traditional archetype of the American judicial
79 Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in §# 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43
F.R.D. 343, 359 (1967).
80 For an extended analysis of Justice Powell's role and rationales as the Burger Court's
swing vote, see Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence ofJustice
Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987).
8I Cf Pressman, Blackmun Calls for Faith During Tumultuous Times, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 29,
1980, at 1, col. 6 & 9 (quoting Blackmun, J.) ("It is a time to be aware of our basic fallibility. It
is a time when one should recognize now and forever that there is no room in the law for
arrogance.").
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hero, he has unconsciously fostered a new image ofjudicial heroism
to guide us into the next 200 years of our constitutional history: the
image of a thoughtful man unafraid to show his anguish; a judge
who does his own work; who is open-minded and willing to change;
who demonstrates a capacity for intellectual growth; and who com-
mands respect for the process of judging by his sheer dedication
and integrity of character.82 This seemingly ordinary man's ex-
traordinary career has redefined our model of judicial courage and
character. It is because of that career that this Society should be
proud to present Harry Blackmun its first Presidents' Award for Dis-
tinguished Contributions to Law and Medicine.
82 For a prediction that this would happen, see Neuborne, supra note 24, at 18, cols. 2-3
("One important measure ofjudicial quality is the ability to generate respect for the processes
of adjudication even from persons who disagree with the result... . Justice] Blackmun has...
a significant role [to play on the Supreme Court] as a justice capable of eliciting respect for
the process of judging.").
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